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GLOBAL-TECH ’S “PATENT” FAILURE:
WHY CONGRESS MUST REVISE THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT’S MENS REA
AFTER GLOBAL-TECH
CHRISTINA M. SINDONI*
INTRODUCTION
The multinational retail corporation Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is a
brand that epitomizes the American dream.  Created as a single store in
1969 by Sam Walton in Bentonville, Arkansas, today the company has
grown to more than 10,500 stores with over two million employees.1
Wal-Mart stores, under a variety of names, can be found across the
globe in such countries as Mexico, the United Kingdom, Japan, and
India.  With hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue each year and a
reputation of being “the world’s largest retailer,” Wal-Mart has become
one of the world’s most valuable companies.2
Building 10,500 megastores in a little over forty years, or approxi-
mately 263 stores per year, is no small feat, especially when 5,500 of
these stores are abroad.3  How could a company, even with the
resources that Wal-Mart has available, move and build so quickly, partic-
ularly in foreign countries, which undoubtedly have many bureaucratic
obstacles?  The New York Times recently raised allegations that Wal-
Mart built up so quickly by bribing foreign officials.4 In particular, the
New York Times conducted an investigation unearthing information
that Wal-Mart had spent more than $24 million on bribes in Mexico to
obtain permits in its rush to build stores.5  One example included brib-
ing officials to allow the building of a store in an alfalfa field, located
barely a mile away from the ancient pyramids of Teotihuacan, where
the government had decided there was too much congestion.6  Rather
than accept Mexico’s decision that they did not want overcrowding near
the valuable and historic tourist location, Wal-Mart allegedly bribed
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.S., University of Pennsylvania,
Wharton School of Business, 2009.  A big thank-you to Professor Jimmy Gurule´ for all of
his guidance and assistance in the creation of this Note.  Special thanks also to my par-
ents, brother, family, and friends for their love and support through the trials of law
school.
1. WAL-MART CORPORATE, http://corporate.walmart.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Strug-
gle, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 2012, at A1 (stating that in September 2005, a senior Wal-Mart
lawyer received an email from a former executive of the company describing “how Wal-
Mart de Mexico had orchestrated a campaign of bribery to win market dominance.”).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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zoning officials to gain permission to build exactly where they were not
wanted.7
The unfolding of this Wal-Mart saga illustrates that corruption of
foreign government officials is a serious problem.  More than 400 com-
panies have admitted to making questionable or illegal payments, with
payments made out of corporate funds to foreign government officials
amounting to nearly $300 million.8  Not only does such fraud under-
mine public confidence in public elected officials, but it also allows cer-
tain companies, particularly those with multitudinous resources at their
disposal, to obtain an unfair advantage in the marketplace.  Addition-
ally, the exposure of bribery can result in many negative implications,
including damage to a company’s image, costly lawsuits, the cancella-
tion of contracts, and the appropriation of valuable assets overseas.9  It
is therefore of the utmost importance that U.S. corporations are not
involved in such unlawful conduct.
To combat this, Congress created the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA), a federal statute that allows prosecution of American com-
panies for bribery committed both domestically and abroad.10  Wal-
Mart’s alleged bribery represents a prime target for FCPA prosecution.
But what evidence is necessary for Wal-Mart to be found guilty?  The
FCPA contains specific guidelines for the mental state (or mens rea)
and guilty act (or actus reus) that are required for a finding of bribery.
Specifically, under the FCPA, it is unlawful for certain people or entities
to make payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining
or retaining business.  Proof must be shown, first, that some sort of pay-
ment was made (the actus reus) and second, that this payment was
made corruptly (mens rea).  As the actus reus component is fairly
straightforward in that a payment was either attempted or not, the diffi-
culties in successful prosecutions under the FCPA more often arise in
connection with the less straightforward mens rea component.
Particularly, the FCPA states that it is unlawful “to make use of the
mails . . .  corruptly in furtherance of an offer.”11  Confusion surrounds
what exactly the term “corruptly” means and what sort of mental state it
encompasses.  Pursuant to case law both specific to the FCPA and in
criminal law generally, corruptly usually means that a defendant had
knowledge of criminal wrongdoing.  This does not connote that the
defendant necessarily knew that what he was doing was a violation of
7. Id.
8. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 1 (1977).
9. Id. at 2.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).  The statute states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities registered pursu-
ant to section 78l of this title or which is required to file reports under section
78o(d) of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer
or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in fur-
therance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment
of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value . . . .
11. 15 U.S.C. § 778dd-2(a) (2012).
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the FCPA or a specific criminal statute; rather, this knowledge means
that the defendant knew that what he was doing was wrongful or unlaw-
ful.  This element of knowledge, depending on the statute, can encom-
pass both positive knowledge and the alternate mental state of willful
blindness (traditionally known as conscious avoidance or deliberate
ignorance).  A person acts with willful blindness when he or she knows
that wrongdoing is occurring, but purposefully avoids learning the
truth about the illegal actions.  In criminal law and under the FCPA,
positive knowledge and willful blindness are considered legal
equivalents, thus providing two potential routes to a finding of a guilty
mens rea.  However, the willful blindness standard has historically been
an area of great confusion for the courts and recent innovations to the
standard may make its application even more difficult.
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB altered the requirements for a finding of willful blindness, narrow-
ing the standard and making it more difficult to prove.12  While the
case is a civil action for patent infringement, the Supreme Court crafted
the new willful blindness standard by borrowing heavily from criminal
law.  Under this new Global-Tech standard, the prosecution must prove
two prongs to establish willful blindness.  It must be shown, first, that
the defendant subjectively believed there was a high probability that a
fact existed and second, that the defendant took deliberate steps to
avoid learning that fact.13  The addition of the second prong requires a
showing that the defendant actually took concrete, affirmative actions
to avoid learning a particular fact, not only that he closed his eyes to
avoid actually knowing.  This innovation will likely cause many unin-
tended consequences.  In particular, statutes outside the realm of pat-
ent infringement, such as the FCPA, that contain a knowledge and
willful blindness component will need to follow this new standard as
well.  In doing so, it will be more difficult to prove either an individual’s
or a company’s wrongdoing under the Act.
In an era where situations such as Wal-Mart’s potential bribery in
Mexico occur at an alarming rate, it is essential that any hindrances to
successful prosecutions under the FCPA be removed.  As such, Con-
gress should amend the FCPA and explicitly outline the components
for willful blindness, removing the affirmative steps requirement
imposed by Global-Tech.  This would allow more vigilant regulation of
corporate activities abroad and prevent outrageous situations such as
Wal-Mart from happening in the future.
With this in mind, I will argue that Congress must step in and
revise the FCPA’s willful blindness standard so that it does not follow
the requirements of Global-Tech.  In Part I of this Note, I will discuss the
FCPA and its mens rea requirement, particularly illustrating how cor-
ruptly refers to knowledge.  In Part II, I will go through the develop-
ment of the knowing form of mens rea and its incorporation of the
willful blindness standard.  In Part III, I will discuss the Supreme
12. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
13. Id. at 2069–70.
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Court’s recent decision in Global-Tech and highlight the changes to the
willful blindness doctrine.  In Part IV, I will discuss how these changes
will impact the law generally and the FCPA in particular.  In Part V, I
will give my recommendations, illustrating how and why Congress
should step in to revise this change to the willful blindness standard in
relation to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 after Congress discovered that
more than 400 corporations had made questionable or illegal payments
in excess of $300 million to foreign officials.14  Such payments ran the
gamut from bribery of high foreign officials to obtain favorable action
by a foreign government to so-called facilitating payments that were
made to ensure that government functionaries discharged certain min-
isterial duties.15  As such, Congress created the FCPA to generally pro-
hibit corrupt payments to foreign officials for the purposes of creating
new business or maintaining old business.16  Particularly, two main pur-
poses were kept in mind: first, to prohibit bribery of foreign officials
and second, to establish certain accounting requirements that made
companies accountable for their behavior.17
The bribery provisions in the FCPA prohibit both individuals and
businesses from “corruptly” making use of any instrumentality of inter-
state commerce so as to “offer, pay, promise, or authorize to pay, either
directly or indirectly, money or anything of value to any foreign official
or political party.”18  A payment that is found to be a bribe can result in
both civil and criminal penalties.19  For individuals, bribery can result
in civil penalties up to $10,000 and criminal penalties up to $250,000
and five years imprisonment.20  Under the Alternative Fines Act, the
fine may be increased to twice the gross financial gain or loss resulting
from the corrupt payment.21  For entities, bribery can result in civil
penalties up to $10,000 and a criminal fine up to $2 million.22  Accord-
ingly, the Alternative Fines Act can cause the fine to be increased for
entities in the same way as with individuals.23
14. Robin Miller, Annotation, Construction and Application of Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, 6 A.L.R. FED. 2d 351 (2005).
15. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC-
TICES ACT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Miller, supra note 14, at § 2 (summarizing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq.).
19. FCPA Penalties, WORLD COMPLIANCE (2013), http://www.worldcompliance.com/
en/resources/due-diligence-legislation/fcpa-legislation/fcpa-penalties.aspx.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.  Whether voluntary disclosure by a corporation results in leniency of a pen-
alty is a topic of debate. A recent study done by New York University Law School suggests
that there is no evidence in actions brought from 2004 to 2011 that voluntary disclosure
resulted in lesser penalties.
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With such a large price to pay for bribery, it is essential to know
what the Department of Justice looks for in order to bring prosecutions
under the FCPA. Overall, the Act is very specific in terms of who is
subject to its jurisdiction and punishments; it is broad in scope and out-
lines who, what, when, and where prosecution is appropriate.  At the
most basic level of the FCPA, there are three elements that constitute a
violation of anti-bribery provisions.24  These include: (1) who (payers
and recipients), (2) what (payment for a business purpose), and (3)
how (with a corrupt intent).
A. The “Who” of the FCPA: Payers and Recipients
In terms of who can be liable, the FPCA defines both recipients
and payers of bribes.  To define recipients of a bribe, the Act prohibits
payments made to a “foreign official” or a “foreign political party or
official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office.”25  These
prohibitions apply regardless of rank or position.26  The purpose of the
FCPA is to focus on the purpose of the payment as opposed to the
duties of any particular official receiving the payment or offer.27  Pay-
ments to intermediaries are also criminalized, meaning that it is unlaw-
ful to make a payment to a third party, including joint venture partners
or agents.28
To define payers of the bribe, the Act applies to individuals, firms,
officers, directors, employees, or agents of a firm, including stockhold-
ers, and allows prosecution of both individuals and corporations.29  The
Act applies to United States businesses and citizens, as well as foreign
companies, and allows extra-territorial jurisdiction over behaviors com-
mitted outside of the country. This jurisdiction is based on whether the
violator is considered an “issuer,” a “domestic concern,” or a foreign
national or business.30  The definitions for each of these can be found
in the language of the statute itself.  An “issuer” is a corporation that
issues securities that are registered domestically or an entity that is
required to file periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC).31  A “domestic concern” is any individual that is a citi-
zen, national, or resident of the United States, or any corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincor-
porated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal
place of business in the United States.32  For both issuers and domestic
concerns, jurisdiction for liability is created under either territorial or
nationality jurisdiction principles; they may be held liable for payments
24. Id.
25. Gregory M. Lipper, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Elusive Question of Intent,
47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (2010).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 20.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id. at 14, 43.
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2012).
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made within or outside of the United States.33  Finally, with the 1998
amendments, jurisdiction under the FCPA was expanded to foreign
companies if it causes a corrupt payment to take place within a territory
of the United States.34  As such, any individual or corporation that is
involved in corrupt payments within or outside of the United States may
be subject to liability under the FCPA.
B. The “What” and “How” of the FCPA: The Meaning of Corruptly
Once the “who” has been established, it is important to consider
what exactly is the illegal act, or actus reus, that the FCPA prevents.
The Act prohibits paying, offering, promising to pay, or authorizing to
pay or offer, money, or anything of value.35  Such actions must be made
in order to assist an individual or a firm in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness.36  This requirement is known as the “business purpose test,” which
the Department of Justice defines broadly, meaning it to encompass
more than just the award or renewal of a contract.37  The business pur-
pose test is meant to encompass payments made in the conduct of busi-
ness or to gain an unfair business advantage.38  Such business does not
necessarily need to be with a foreign government or foreign govern-
ment instrumentality to be considered under the definition.
It is important to note that the FCPA contains a narrow exception
for “facilitating or expediting payments” made in furtherance of a rou-
tine governmental action.39  Examples of routine governmental action
include such activities as processing visas, providing police protection
or mail service, or supplying utilities like phone, power, or water.40  It
does not include any decisions related to awarding new business or con-
tinuing old business.  The Department of Justice Handbook gives the
example that a facilitating payment would be considered a small
amount paid to have the power turned on at a factory as opposed to
paying an inspector to avoid the fact that the factory does not have a
valid permit.41  A payment will never be seen as “facilitating” if it in any
way involves a misuse of power or an act outside of an official’s position.
In general, this exception is tricky to apply, and courts will be hesitant
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 11.
34. Id. at 12.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).  The statute states in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities registered pursu-
ant to section 78l of this title or which is required to file reports under section
78o(d) of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer
or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in fur-
therance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment
of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value . . . .
36. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 12.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 12–13.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2012).
40. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 25.
41. Id.
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to categorize a payment as facilitating and beyond the reach of the
FCPA.
For acts outside of this exception, the payment must be completed
with a corrupt intent or mens rea.  Most basically, Black’s Law Dictionary
defines corruptly as “[i]n a corrupt or depraved manner; by means of
corruption or bribery” or as used in criminal law statutes, “a wrongful
desire for pecuniary gain or other advantage.”42  While this definition
appears relatively straightforward, many problems arise in the applica-
tion of corruptly.  In particular, not only is there no consensus on the
definition of the term among the courts, but the Model Jury Instruc-
tions for the Ninth Circuit emphasize that the term “corruptly” is capa-
ble of different meanings in different statutory contexts.43
Accordingly, a look at the varying uses of “corruptly” can shed light
on its use in the FCPA specifically.  For example, 26 U.S.C. § 7212, a
statute involving attempts to interfere with the administration of Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) laws, describes its actus reus and mens rea as
“[w]hoever corruptly or by force or threats of force . . . endeavors to
intimidate or impede any officer or employee.”44  Initially, the term
“corruptly” under this Act was defined as an “improper motive” or a
“wicked or evil purpose.”45  However, under United States v. Reeves, the
Fifth Circuit explained that these definitions should not be adopted,
and instead corruptly should be defined to describe an act “done with
an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with the official duty and
rights of others.”46  The court wished to emphasize not the act in itself
or acts specifically driven by an evil purpose, but the advantage to be
derived from the act.47  This illustrates one of the many ways the intent
of corruptly has evolved.  Additionally, under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(2)(A), a statute aimed at the prevention of witness tamper-
ing, the term corruptly is understood to reflect some consciousness of
wrongdoing.48  This can be contrasted with another statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b)(2)(B), involving bribery of public officials and witnesses,
which states that corruptly refers to the defendant’s intent to be influ-
enced to perform an act in return for financial gain.49  These various
definitions have nuances that lead to differences in application.  As
such, it is essential to understand the meaning of corruptly in the con-
text of each particular statute.
In United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit defined corruptly as specifi-
cally applied to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  The defendants,
who were the president and vice-president of a grain-exporting corpora-
42. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009).
43. MANUAL OF MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 9TH CIR. § 3.14 (1995).
44. 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (2012).
45. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 48:04
(6th ed. 2013).
46. United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting United
States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979)).
47. Id. at 999.
48. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704–06 (2005).
49. See United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1978).
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tion, were charged with paying Haitian officials to reduce duties and
taxes on rice exports.50  A jury found violations of the FCPA, specifically
that the defendants willfully and corruptly offered payments to a for-
eign official for the purposes of influencing business.  The court’s
instructions to the jury defined a corrupt act as one that is “done volun-
tarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose or evil motive of accom-
plishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by
some unlawful method or means.”51  The defendants appealed, claim-
ing that the jury instructions were inadequate relating to the mens rea
requirements of the FCPA.  The Fifth Circuit held this definition as ade-
quate, but emphasized that the government must prove, and a jury
must find beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants both corruptly
and willfully violated the FCPA.52
However, because the FCPA does not define the term willfully, the
courts looked to the common law interpretation of the term.53  The
court stated that generally there are three levels of interpretation.
Under the first level, willfulness means “committing an act, and having
knowledge of that act.”54  In these instances, the defendant does not
have to know of the “specific terms of the statute or even the existence
of the statute”; the defendant’s knowledge is sufficient.55  At the inter-
mediate level, willfulness requires that the defendant knew that his
actions were in some way unlawful; once again, no knowledge of a spe-
cific statute is necessary, just a general feeling of “doing bad.”56  The
third and strictest level requires knowledge of the precise statute, which
usually is reserved for statutes of extreme complexity.57 The court held
that for the FCPA, the first or second level of willfulness is sufficient.58
More importantly, it is essential to note that in either instance, will-
fully means that the defendant acted knowingly.  Thus, the Court also
instructed the jury on the definition of an act done “knowingly,” stating
“to be guilty under the Act, defendants must have knowingly (i.e., vol-
untarily and intentionally) acted with awareness of these unlawful
ends.”59  This line of reasoning establishes that the FCPA requires a
mens rea of both corruptly and willfully, which by definition means
knowingly.  Thus, the intent element under the FCPA dictates that the
actus reus for the crime of bribery must be committed corruptly and
willfully, which under the Court’s holding in United States v. Kay, means
that the bribe was done knowingly.
50. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2007).
51. Id. at 446.
52. Id. at 446–47.
53. Id. at 447.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 448.
57. Id. This strict level of knowledge usually applies to tax evasion cases. See, e.g.,
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
58. Kay, 513 F.3d at 450–51. See also Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193
(1998).
59. Kay, 513 F.3d at 449.
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This is reinforced through the Department of Justice’s handbook
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  Specifically, the handbook states
that when adopting the FCPA, Congress meant “corruptly” to connote
“an intent or desire to wrongly influence the recipient.”60  There is no
requirement that the act being influenced succeed in its purpose.61
The handbook further states that for an individual defendant to be
criminally liable under the FCPA, he or she must act “willfully.”62
While not defined explicitly in the FCPA, the handbook states that
courts have generally construed this term to “connote an act committed
voluntarily and purposefully, and with a ‘bad’ purpose, i.e., with ‘knowl-
edge that [a defendant] was doing a bad act under the general rules of
law.’”63  The case law and Department of Justice handbook thus illus-
trate that the mens rea component for an FCPA crime encompasses
corruptly, willfully, and most importantly knowingly.
II. THE MENS REA KNOWINGLY:  DEFINITION AND APPLICATION
In criminal law under the Model Penal Code, there are four possi-
ble mens rea levels for any given crime.64  These include purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.65  Following the MPC, a person
is said to act knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when, “if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attend-
ant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and if the element involves a result of his con-
duct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result.”66  This mens rea level of knowingly, as defined by the
MPC and courts, has greatly changed since its creation in 1962, broad-
ening and narrowing depending on the given circumstances of a crime.
A. Introduction and Evolution of Willful Blindness
An innovation to the knowingly standard came in 1976 under
United States v. Jewell.  Under this case, the defendant was convicted in
district court of a violation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1970, and he appealed, contesting the mens rea
component of knowingly.67  The defendant argued that “knowingly”
under the statute required positive knowledge to amount to a violation,
and therefore, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had positive knowledge in order to result in a conviction.68
The government claimed that it could meet the burden of proof with-
out positive knowledge if they could show that the defendant’s lack of
knowledge was based on a “conscious purpose to avoid learning the
60. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 14.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).
68. Id. at 698.
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truth.”69  The court upheld the side of the government, stating, “If a
party has suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further
enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to
have knowledge.”70  If a statute specifically states that positive knowl-
edge is required under its definition of “knowingly”, then nothing less
than that will do.  However, “knowingly” otherwise can be considered to
include the mental state where “the defendant is aware that the fact in
question is highly probable but consciously avoids enlightenment”; in
this way, the statute can be satisfied by such proof.71  This case was
therefore a landmark in the sense that for the first time, willful blind-
ness was held as the equivalent of knowledge.  “Knowingly” as a mens
rea component, thus, can refer to either positive knowledge or willful
blindness to the crime or an element of the crime.
B. Willful Blindness and the FCPA
As applied to the FCPA, it is important to look to the statute’s exact
language to determine whether willful blindness is included in the stat-
ute’s mens rea.  In the FCPA’s original form, the mens rea element was
mere negligence.  Congress eliminated this standard in 1988 and used
the knowing standard instead.  Under the bribery provisions of the
FCPA, the mens rea component standard is corruptly and willfully,
which according to United States v. Kay, referenced previously, is the
equivalent of knowingly.  Following a conference report on the FCPA,
this corruptly/willfully/knowingly standard covers both actual knowl-
edge as well as conscious disregard or deliberate indifference.72  In par-
ticular, the Report stated,
The conferees intend that the requisite “state of mind” for this
category of offense include a “conscious purpose to avoid learning
the truth.” Thus, the “knowing” standard adopted covers both
prohibited actions that are taken with “actual knowledge” of
intended results as well as other actions that, falling short of what
the law term “positive knowledge” nevertheless evidences a con-
scious disregard or deliberate ignorance of known circumstances
that should reasonably alert one to the high probability of viola-
tions of the act.73
Congress thus adopted a standard for the FCPA’s mens rea recog-
nizing that actual knowledge may not be required.  Instead, an aware-
ness of a “high probability” of an illegal action, coupled with a
“deliberate” decision to avoid gaining information and consciously
avoiding the truth can suffice.74  Nowhere in the legislative history is
69. Id. at 701.
70. Id. at 700, quoting GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL 157 (2d
ed. 1961).
71. Id. at 704.
72. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, pt. 1, at 919–20 (1977).
73. Id. See also Paul T. Friedman & Ruti Smithline, Is “Conscious Avoidance” Sufficient
to Establish Knowledge Under the FCPA?, BUS. L. TODAY, Feb. 2012, at 1.
74. Id. at 1.
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there a requirement for any concrete evidence of affirmative steps
taken to avoid learning a fact.  As such, the FCPA, under its mens rea,
encompasses the “knowingly” standard of intent, which has been
defined to include willful blindness.
C. Difficulties with the Willful Blindness Standard
The emphasis on what the knowing standard of mens rea encom-
passes under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is important as it can
serve as a gateway to prosecutions.  A too liberal or too broad knowl-
edge standard could make prosecutions much easier under the Act,
which could ultimately negatively impact American businesses.  In par-
ticular, the original standard under the FCPA when it was enacted in
1977, stated that knowledge meant “while knowing or having reason to
know.”75  Critics strongly opposed this standard, stating it was much too
vague and fearing that it would “totally cripple U.S. corporate activities
in certain countries.”76  In response to this criticism, Congress nar-
rowed the knowing requirement to what it is today: specifically, cor-
ruptly and knowingly, also including willful blindness.  Despite these
legislative changes however, there still exists a great amount of uncer-
tainty as to what level of knowledge is needed exactly for prosecutions
under the FCPA.  If the standard is construed too narrowly and requires
a high level of knowledge, prosecutions will become more difficult and
corporations could potentially get away with bribery.  If the standard is
too broad and requires lower levels of knowledge, the opposite effect
will occur.  If there is just general uncertainty, legislative intent could
be forgotten, leading to inconsistent judicial guidance and haphazard
prosecutions.
The theory behind the willful blindness standard illustrates some
of the problems in its application.  According to one commentator,
“[c]ourts and criminal law scholars have struggled for decades to sort
out the relationship between the basic concept of knowledge . . .  and
the concept of ‘willful blindness.’”77  There are a number of reasons
why this is the case.  Firstly, such difficultly might stem from the fact
that the willful blindness standard is “more of a technical, stipulative
term of legal art with no precise analogue in everyday speech.”78  Con-
sequently, confusion arises with the theory of the doctrine as to whether
the willful blindness standard is an alternative to positive knowledge or
a species of positive knowledge.79  The difference lies in whether an
individual is said to have positive knowledge or not when attempting to
prove she was willfully blind.  If willful blindness is an alternative, then
75. Gary P. Naftalis, Navigating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 8 NO. 26 ANDREWS
DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 11, 18 (2002).
76. Id.
77. Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102
YALE L.J. 2231, 2231 (1993).
78. Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the
“Equal Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994
WIS. L. REV. 29, 35 (1994).
79. Id. at 34–35.
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the defendant does not need to have any positive knowledge.  If willful
blindness is a species, then the defendant does.  This choice impacts
the level of proof necessary, as a requirement of positive knowledge
would be harder to prove.
These difficulties likely undergirded the formation of the Model
Penal Code (MPC), in that the drafters of the MPC took a different
approach to willful blindness than common law based on such eviden-
tiary issues.  Under common law, which employs a strict definition of
knowledge, willful blindness is considered an alternative to a positive
knowledge mens rea.80  The MPC, on the other hand, employs a
broader knowledge definition.  In particular, willful blindness was not
viewed as “actual knowledge disguised by pretended ignorance” mean-
ing positive knowledge still existed; instead, one who is willfully blind is
considered to be “one who acts with a high level of awareness of a par-
ticular fact.”81  According to one commentator, the drafters of the MPC
may have predicted the difficulties that a requirement of willful blind-
ness creates in terms of evidence required for proof.82  Under the com-
mon law approach, evidence is required to reveal that the defendant
consciously avoided a certain fact, did not care enough to investigate,
or had actual knowledge of the fact.  Under the MPC, this is not neces-
sary; it must only be shown that the defendant committed the prohib-
ited act, and that the defendant possessed a high level of awareness of
the facts in question.83  Such an approach is, therefore, much easier,
and such a straightforward application of the MPC should therefore be
adopted in all courts.84
Further, willful blindness can be used as a substitute for positive
knowledge, as the MPC maintains, because the two are moral
equivalents.85  In particular, following the theorists Professor Perkins
and Professor Boyce, “[n]o honest person would deliberately fail to find
out the truth for fear of learning that what he was thinking of doing
would violate the law.”86  In this way, a person who deliberately ignores
or avoids trying to find out the truth is just as blameworthy as an indi-
vidual who had knowledge of a particular crime.  Thus, the approach of
the MPC using willful blindness as a substitute or alternative to positive
knowledge is in theory justified.
Such a theoretical debate impacts the way in which courts apply
the willful blindness standard.  Since United States v. Jewell, all federal
circuits have employed willful blindness doctrines.87  In fact, virtually all
80. Id. at 36. See also John N. Gallo & Daniel M. Greenfield, The Corporate Crimi-
nal Defendant’s Illusory Right to Trial:  A Proposal for Reform, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL’Y 525 (2014) (advocating reform for the corporate criminal liability
process).
81. Marcus, supra note 77, at 2235.
82. Id. at 2237.
83. Id. at 2237–38.
84. Id. at 2253.
85. Husak & Callender, supra note 78, at 54.
86. Id. at 54 (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 873 (3d
ed. 1982)).
87. O’MALLEY, supra note 45 at § 17:09.
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courts and commentators agree that the mental state of willful blind-
ness is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the mens rea of know-
ingly.88  The willful blindness or deliberate ignorance instruction
generally is defined in the Federal Jury Instructions as:
The government may prove that Defendant acted “knowingly” by
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this defendant deliber-
ately closed [his] [her] eyes to what would otherwise have been obvi-
ous to [him] [her].  No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by
deliberately ignoring what is obvious.  A finding beyond a reasona-
ble doubt of an intent of Defendant to avoid knowledge or
enlightenment would permit the jury to find knowledge.  Stated
another way, a person’s knowledge of a particular fact may be
shown from a deliberate or intentional ignorance or deliberate or
intentional blindness to the existence of that fact.89
Following the establishment of this intent element under United
States v. Jewell, it was understood that such an instruction should only be
given to the jury “when a defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge
and there are facts in evidence that support an inference of deliberate
ignorance.”90
However, the circuit courts differ in the amount that they make use
of the willful blindness jury instruction and many of the definitions
across the circuits seem to conflict.  Under United States v. Azubike
decided in the First Circuit, the trial court stated that to infer knowl-
edge under willful blindness, two things must be established: “first, that
[the defendant] was aware of the high probability of the fact in ques-
tion, second, that [the defendant] consciously and deliberately avoided
learning of that fact.”91  This was furthered in United States v. Lizardo,
where the required elements to allow an instruction for willful blind-
ness were stated as, “[1] a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, [2] the
facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and [3] the
instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood as mandating
an inference of knowledge.”92  In both instances, direct evidence of
willful blindness was not required; instead, it was sufficient to show
warning signs that call out for investigation or reveal “flags” of
suspicion.
Confusion arises under the Second Circuit as to whether a con-
scious avoidance instruction must include whether the defendant actu-
ally believed or did not believe the existence of a particular fact, stating:
This court has repeatedly emphasized that, in giving the conscious
avoidance charge, the district judge should instruct the jury that
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is established (1) if
88. Husak and Callender, supra note 78, at 33–34.
89. O’MALLEY, supra note 45 at § 17:09.
90. United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984).
91. United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2009).
92. United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 85–86 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 440 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, (2) unless
he actually believes that it does not exist.93
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit wished to establish that this definition was
not to be confused with a finding of negligence stating:
Because the instruction permits a jury to convict a defendant with-
out a finding that the defendant was actually aware of the exis-
tence of illegal conduct, the deliberate ignorance instruction
poses the risk that a jury might convict the defendant on a lesser
negligence standard—the defendant should have been aware of
the illegal conduct.94
Additionally, some circuits employ the MPC definition of willful blind-
ness that the defendant must ignore a high probability that the dis-
puted fact exists.  Further, the MPC employs the concept that
knowledge cannot be established if the defendant “actually believes”
that the disputed fact does not exist.  Other circuits do not follow this.
For example, no Sixth Circuit case has required this concept to be
included in jury instructions surrounding deliberate ignorance.
To complicate the issue even further, confusion comes from the
idea that deliberate ignorance can be seen in two ways: first, through
overt physical acts and second, through purely cognitive avoidance.95
Courts acknowledge “[t]he ostrich instruction is designed for cases in
which there is evidence that the defendant, knowing or strongly sus-
pecting that he is involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure
that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and
extent of those dealings.”96  However, there are also instances where
the defendant does not actually do anything physically to avoid learn-
ing, but instead mentally cuts off curiosity by an effort of will.  In these
instances, there is no “outward physical manifestation of an attempt to
avoid facts”; however, the deliberate effort to avoid learning the truth is
still present.97  This makes such an individual equally guilty, but courts
have had some difficulty in applying the willful blindness standard in
such instances, particularly as this illustrates that the willful blindness
mens rea is a subjective mental state, not necessarily evidenced by objec-
tive actions.  It is also important to again note that none of the com-
mentators’ or courts’ definitions of willful blindness require any kind of
showing of evidence of objective, deliberate steps taken to avoid
knowing.
III. GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES
Amidst this landscape of legal uncertainty comes the recently
decided Supreme Court case, Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB, which
greatly alters previous conceptions of the application of the willful
blindness standard.  While this case lies in the civil arena in that it deals
93. United States v. Shareef, 714 F.2d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 1983).
94. United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990).
95. O’MALLEY, supra note 45 at § 17:09.
96. United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.3d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990).
97. Id.
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with a patent infringement dispute, the Court directly addresses the ele-
ments necessary for a finding of willful blindness, basing their decision
in the development of the standard in criminal law.  With the Court’s
imposition of particular elements, the application of the willful blind-
ness standard in the future may greatly change.
In Global-Tech, the company SEB invented an innovative deep fryer,
obtained a patent in the United States for its design, and began selling
the product domestically and abroad.98  After SEB began selling the
fryers, Sunbeam Products asked defendant Pentalpha Enterprises, a
Hong Kong home appliance maker and wholly-owned subsidiary of
defendant Global-Tech Appliances, to create fryers that matched partic-
ular specifications.99  In creating the requested fryer, Pentalpha pur-
chased an SEB fryer that was made for a foreign market and thus had
no evidence of U.S. patenting, and mimicked the fryer’s design except
for the cosmetic features.100  Pentalpha then retained an attorney to
conduct a right-to-use study, without informing him that the fryer was a
copy of SEB’s product, and the attorney issued an opinion letter stating
that the fryer did not infringe any patents that he had found.101  Pental-
pha then started to sell their fryers to Sunbeam, which resold them in
the United States under its own trademarks and with a price that under-
cut SEB.102
Accordingly, SEB filed for patent infringement against Sunbeam
and the case was settled.103  Pentalpha, despite being notified of the
lawsuit, continued to sell its fryers to other companies.104  SEB there-
fore filed another lawsuit against Pentalpha alleging violations of 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) relating to active inducement of patent infringe-
ment.105  This statute requires a finding of knowledge, specifically that
“the alleged infringer knew or should have known that his actions
would induce actual infringements.”106  The district court found for
SEB, but Pentalpha appealed claiming there was no evidence that they
knew of any patent infringement.107  The Federal Circuit affirmed,
holding that although there was no direct evidence that Pentalpha
knew of SEB’s patent before it received notice of the Sunbeam suit,
there was adequate proof that it deliberately disregarded a known risk
that SEB had a protective patent.108  They held this disregard as a form
of actual knowledge.
The case was then appealed again and the Supreme Court granted
review. Pentalpha continued to argue that active inducement liability
under § 271(b) requires more than deliberate indifference and instead
98. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2011).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2065.
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requires actual knowledge.  The Supreme Court evaluated this argu-
ment, first by reviewing the text of the statute, which they found to be
inconclusive, then by looking back through case law where they found
that Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., resolved the
question at issue.109  Specifically, a badly fractured majority in Aro Man-
ufacturing stated that knowledge was required for patent infringement,
specifically under § 271(c), which the Supreme Court in Global-Tech
took to apply to § 271(b) as well.110  As such, the Court held that
induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the
induced acts resulted in patent infringement.111
The majority then assessed the propriety of using the deliberate
indifference or willful blindness doctrine.  After looking back through
criminal law’s history, the majority stated, “Given the long history of
willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the Federal Judiciary, we
can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for
induced patent infringement . . . .”112  However, the Supreme Court
did not agree with the way in which the Federal Circuit applied the
standard.  This is where the innovation in willful blindness emerges.
The Supreme Court stated that there must be two basic requirements to
a willful blindness standard.113  First, the defendant must subjectively
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and second, it
must be shown that the defendant took deliberate steps to avoid learn-
ing that fact.114
The first prong of the standard remains fairly consistent with prior
formulations of the willful blindness standard.  The innovation comes
with the second part, particularly that the defendant must take deliber-
ate actions to avoid learning of that fact.  This requires a much more
stringent proof of culpability than the prior deliberate indifference
standard formulations and surpasses both recklessness and negligence.
The first prong of a high degree of certainty has been used, sometimes
with slightly different constructions, in courts since the inception of the
willful blindness standard.  The second prong, however, has not.  This
requirement for deliberate action not only completely eliminates the
form of willful blindness that is purely cognitive, but also requires evi-
dence that will likely be very difficult to provide, no matter the subject
matter of the case.  The addition of this second prong raises a plethora
of problems, including questions as to what type of evidence will suffice
to meet the new standard.  In attempting to clarify the willful blindness
standard to make it easier and more concrete to apply, it seems the
Supreme Court unfortunately had the opposite effect, creating a host of
issues and making the standard even trickier.
109. Id. at 2068.
110. Id. See also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476
(1964).
111. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
112. Id. at 2069–70.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts and held
that there was sufficient evidence that Pentalpha acted with a willfully
blind intent, even when considered under the new standard.115  The
evidence the majority cited was a string of inferences that stated
because the fryer was an innovation in the United States, one would
expect it to have a patent, as any superior product would in such a
market.116  The fact that Pentalpha copied all but the cosmetic features
of the fryer showed that they knew the technology was something spe-
cial and therefore valuable.  The Court also states that it was telling that
Pentalpha not only chose to copy an overseas version of the fryer
despite its intention to sell in the United States, but also did not tell
their patent attorney that they had copied anything.117  This evidence
combined, the Court states, “was more than sufficient for a jury to find
that Pentalpha subjectively believed there was a high probability that
SEB’s fryer was patented, [and] that Pentalpha took deliberate steps to
avoid knowing that fact,” therefore willfully blinding itself to the
infringement.118
While the Court in Global-Tech upheld a finding of knowledge
under a theory of willful blindness, the re-defining the Court did to the
standard will most likely make it more difficult to prosecute using will-
ful blindness in the future.  This is because providing specific evidence
that tangible steps were taken to avoid learning a given fact is a heavy
burden.  It will likely be very difficult to provide such evidence, espe-
cially in corporations where a lot of work is done behind closed doors.
To extrapolate further, statutes containing a knowledge mens rea will
become more difficult to prosecute.  Unless knowledge is specifically
defined in the language of the statute, it will include positive knowledge
and willful blindness as an alternative.  Because Global-Tech heightened
the requirements necessary for willful blindness, a finding of knowledge
mens rea will become more difficult to prove, ultimately frustrating
prosecution strategies and court analyses.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL-TECH
The impact of Global-Tech and its alteration of the willful blindness
standard is already reflected in many recent lower court decisions.
Since Global-Tech was decided in 2011, nearly 130 cases have utilized the
language of the opinion as a citing reference, applying and examining
the new willful blindness standard, and grappling with the best way to
follow the rigid elements and heightened standard, specifically prong
two.  While these cases span a variety of subject matters, encompassing
both criminal and civil causes of action, many reflect the difficulty in
providing the correct type of evidence now necessary for a finding of
willful blindness based on the new language and standard.  Some cases
simply are unable to provide sufficient evidence of “deliberate steps,”
115. Id. at 2072.
116. Id. at 2071.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2072.
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others refuse to apply Global-Tech and differentiate it on a technicality,
and others yet ignore the “deliberate steps” second prong requirement
or restate the Global-Tech standard in a way to make the burden of proof
easier to meet.
A number of these cases were simply unable to establish a finding
of knowledge, due to the heightened requirements under Global-Tech.
In Bose Corp. v. SDI Technologies, Bose commenced an action against SDI
for allegedly infringing a patent involving interactive sound reproduc-
ing.119  After citing the new Global-Tech standard, the court stated,
“Arguably, this intent standard makes patent prosecutions more diffi-
cult.”120  SDI was not found as infringing as no knowledge could be
established.121  Instead, the facts were taken to construe that SDI did
not have the requisite intent and the court concluded that, “Bose can-
not prove the specific intent necessary to proceed to trial on contribu-
tory infringement or inducement” and that “Bose has not shown that
SDI knew . . . .”122  This difficulty can also be seen in MONEC Holding v.
Motorola, where a patent owner brought an infringement action for a
flat electronic device housing a processing system.123  The court specifi-
cally stated that to state a claim for willful blindness, a complaint must
identify affirmative actions taken by the defendant to “avoid gaining
actual knowledge of the patent-in-suit . . . .”124  The majority held that
the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to establish knowledge
or willful blindness, and that the “allegations are insufficient to estab-
lish ‘active efforts by an inducer’ to avoid knowledge . . . .”125  Finally, in
Mikkelson Graphic, the plaintiff was not even able to pass summary judg-
ment on the case because “there [was] no evidence that [the defen-
dant] deliberately shielded itself from clear evidence that the acts it
induced constituted patent infringement.”126  Concrete behavior that
“avoids knowledge” is thus a difficult fact to prove and establish in
court.
Alternatively, some cases have simply refused to apply Global-Tech
or extend its holding, ostensibly due to its difficult application, though
the subject matter seems relevant.  For example, in Sovereign Military, a
Catholic order brought an action against a non-Catholic religious order
for trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and
deceptive trade practices.127  Although the court cited the Global-Tech
119. Bose Corp. v. SDI Technologies Imation Corp., No. 09-11439-WGY, 2012 WL
2862057, at *1 (D. Mass. July 10, 2012).
120. Id. at *9.
121. Id. at *11.
122. Id.
123. MONEC Holding AG v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D.
Del. 2012).
124. Id. at 230.
125. Id. at 234 (quoting Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060,
2071 (2011)).
126. Mikkelson Graphic Engineering, Inc. v. Zund America, Inc., No. 07-C-0391,
2011 WL 6122377, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 8, 2011).
127. Sovereign Military Hospitaller v. Florida Priory, 702 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.
2012).
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standard, the majority refused to apply it, stating, “It was error to look
to [Global-Tech] for the applicable standard to analyze a claim for fraud
on the PTO” and cautioned against applying patent standards to a
trademark case.128  It held, “[t]o the extent the district court relied on
the inapplicable ‘willful blindness’ standard to find the required intent
to deceive the PTO, it erred.”129  Despite this case being in the realm of
intellectual property rights, the court did not wish to allow a finding of
willful blindness.  Perhaps this is because the evidence required under
that standard is too difficult to prove, illustrating another way the courts
have had difficulties in applying Global-Tech.
Additionally, a third set of cases uses the Global-Tech standard, but
states it in varying terms so as to make the required evidence easier to
provide.  This can be seen in United States v. Jinwright, where the defend-
ants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States, tax eva-
sion, and other charges.130  The district court issued a willful blindness
jury instruction, which the defendant stated was in error as there was
not sufficient evidence to warrant such an instruction.131  While citing
Global-Tech, the standard the court used was that knowledge could be
proven by establishing that the defendant “deliberately shielded himself
from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the
circumstances.”132  The evidence must just support “an inference that a
defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability” of the existence
of the crime.133  This varies from the Global-Tech standard, which held
that there must be first, a subjective belief that there is a high
probability that a fact exists, and second, that deliberate steps have
been taken to avoid learning that fact.  The court in Jinwright seems to
just ignore this second component.
The second component was likely ignored because of the extreme
confusion surrounding what type of evidence is even necessary to meet
the standard.  Following the exact wording of Global-Tech, the defendant
“must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”134  Such
behavior would likely include deleting emails, shredding files, telling
someone to destroy evidence, or destroying records.  As the standard
explicitly says “deliberate” this would most likely not cover omissions,
which by definition is the neglect of a duty or the failure to carry out an
act.135  The law must impose a specific duty which a person ignores in
order to qualify as an omission and create criminal liability.  The FCPA
imposes no such duty to investigate in its bribery provisions. As such,
simply failing to investigate or failing to look into things further, even
when there is a suspicion of wrongdoing, would not fulfill the second
prong of the Global-Tech standard.  Instead, it would only point to the
128. Id. at 1291.
129. Id. at 1292.
130. United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2012).
131. Id. at 478.
132. Id. at 478–79.
133. Id. at 479 (quoting United States v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 122 (4th Cir. 2011).
134. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB, 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
135. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1086 (9th ed. 2009).
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first prong that the defendant subjectively believes there is a high
probability that a fact exists.  It seems that only very rarely will such
concrete evidence be available so as to prove the second prong under
Global-Tech.
Accordingly, since the holding in Global-Tech, the lower courts have
struggled with the best way to apply the new willful blindness standard,
particularly the second prong requiring evidence of deliberate steps.
Some courts face the issue head-on and the plaintiff is simply left with-
out a case, as they are unable to provide sufficient evidence of discrete
steps taken to avoid learning a fact.  Others use questionable circum-
stantial evidence to meet the burden of proof.  Other courts avoid
Global-Tech altogether, declining to apply the standard in similar subject
matter cases, and still others state the standard in a different way so as
to avoid the harsh requirements.  Each of these cases illustrates the dif-
ficulties courts have had in applying the willful blindness standard
under Global-Tech, and these difficulties will likely increase as time goes
on.
A. Implications of Global-Tech on the FCPA
These issues will plague the application and enforcement of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a troublesome notion given the Act’s
importance in combating bribery and corporate crime.  Since the
inception of the Act, prosecutions have been proliferating, illustrating
the inherent and pervasive nature of bribery.  In particular, since 1978,
there have been more than two hundred cases covering activity in
eighty different countries raised by the Department of Justice against
corporations and individuals on FCPA grounds.136  Particularly, in the
last few years, the focus on FCPA prosecutions by the government has
increased dramatically, resulting in a skyrocketing increase of FCPA
prosecutions.137  Culminating in the most recent case currently being
brought against Wal-Mart, these cases have cost corporations nearly half
a billion dollars in internal investigations.138  FCPA probes have
resulted in a number of astounding government settlements with sev-
eral different companies; for example, Siemens AG settled for nearly
$800 million.139  Combined across all sectors of industry, nearly $4.5
billion in penalties have been collected.  While the United States is only
one of a number of nations that bans bribery overseas, it is the country
that has brought by far the most cases compared to anywhere else with
more than 100 companies under investigation.140  This strongly illus-
trates the inherent and pervasive nature of bribery and corruption in
American corporations, particularly by the number of instances of brib-
ery found across companies in all industries.
136. Where the Bribes Are, MINTZ GROUP, http://fcpamap.com/ (last updated July 11,
2013).
137. John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an
Expanding FCPA, 26 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 25, 26 (2012).
138. Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2012, at B1.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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To estimate the impact of Global-Tech, it is useful to examine an
FCPA willful blindness case decided before the new willful blindness
standard was established and determine how it would turn out if the
new standard were applied instead.  In United States v. Kozeny, the defen-
dant was convicted of conspiring to violate the FCPA by agreeing to
make payments to Azeri officials to encourage privatization of SOCAR
(State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic).141  On appeal, defendant
Bourke argued that the court erroneously allowed a conscious avoid-
ance charge.142 The court stated that a conscious avoidance (or deliber-
ate ignorance) charge was proper when “a defendant asserts the lack of
some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction and the
appropriate factual predicate for the charge exists.”143  A factual predi-
cate exists when “the evidence is such that a rational juror may reach
the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously
avoided confirming that fact.”  In this case, the evidence available
included phone conversations where the defendant explicitly stated his
fears that bribery may have been occurring.  In particular, Bourke
states:
What happens if they break a law in . . . Kazakhstan, or they bribe
somebody in Kazakhstan and we’re at dinner and . . . one of the
guys says, ‘Well, you know, we paid some guy ten million bucks to
get this now.’  I don’t know, you know, if somebody says that to
you, I’m not part of it . . . I didn’t endorse it.  But let’s say [ ] they
tell you that. You got knowledge of it.  What do you do with
that? . . . I’m just saying to you in general . . . do you think business is
done at arm’s length in this part of the world.144
Even evidence where the defendant so obviously speaks of bribery
would likely not meet the heightened Global-Tech willful blindness stan-
dard.  The evidence above would likely fulfill the first prong, that the
defendant subjectively believed that there was a high probability of
wrongdoing.  His statements illustrate that subjective belief, but they do
not rise to the level of concrete, deliberate actions required for the sec-
ond prong.  It would be necessary that defendant Bourke not only com-
mented on the potential for bribery, but also said that he was actively
doing something like deleting files.  Because he is only commenting on
his belief that bribery may be happening, there are no deliberate
actions.  This case would therefore fail under the new Global-Tech two-
pronged analysis for willful blindness.  This is a frightening thought,
given the apparentness of the wrongdoing in this case.
United States v. Kozeny and the non-FCPA willful blindness cases
illustrate a number of issues.  Firstly, the new Global-Tech standard
requires specific evidence of deliberate steps taken to avoid learning of
141. United States v. Kozeny, 664 F.Supp.2d 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
142. Id. at 385.
143. Id. at 385–86 (quoting United States v. Kaplan, 490 F.3d 110, 127 (2d Cir.
2007)).
144. Id. at 387.
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an illegal bribery situation.  Such evidence will be more difficult to pro-
vide, meaning prosecutors will have a more difficult time bringing suc-
cessful bribery convictions under the FCPA.  In particular, while
corporations are working to become more transparent, the task of col-
lecting evidence of dealings occurring in massive companies with
thousands of employees, where the deals are conducted over a long
period of time, often in foreign countries, and behind closed doors
with limited records, seems a nearly impossible task for prosecutors.
This, however, is assuming that the standard will even be followed
literally.  Based on the splintering of case law subsequent to Global-Tech
in fields outside of the FCPA, it seems that generally lower courts will
have great difficulty figuring out how to apply the standard at all.  Some
courts may ignore the changes altogether.  Others may allow many sorts
of circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to prove deliberate igno-
rance.  This will make it so that, depending on where an FCPA case is
brought, it will be extremely difficult to predict how a given case will go.
Different courts may find differently depending on their application of
the standard.  This will create a total lack of uniformity for FCPA prose-
cutions as it is completely unclear what kind of evidence is necessary to
even meet the second prong of the Global-Tech willful blindness stan-
dard.  Additionally, the legislative intent behind the mens rea of the
FCPA seems to be getting lost in the shuffle.  In any of these situations,
FCPA prosecutions will face great difficulties moving forward.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION
With all of the uncertainty surrounding the FCPA and its mens rea
requirement, drastic action must be taken, otherwise in the face of
mounting bribery investigations, the law will just continue to dis-
integrate and contradict itself.  With Wal-Mart’s FCPA case on the hori-
zon, the FCPA case law on mens rea is a veritable mess, compounded by
the recent decision in Global-Tech.  It is almost impossible to predict how
the case could turn out, as there is contradictory authority relating to
what level of knowledge is necessary across all of the circuits.  As such,
Congress needs to step in and define exactly what is required for the
knowledge element under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The historical process of statute creation is that Congress writes
statutes and the courts attempt to follow the legislative intent of Con-
gress when they wrote the statutes to correctly apply them.  However,
when courts interpret the statutes inconsistently or contrary to Congres-
sional intent, Congress can amend the areas in the statute that are cre-
ating trouble.  This can be seen in United States v. Santos, a Supreme
Court case decided in 2008.  In this case, defendant Santos ran an ille-
gal lottery where runners took commissions from the bets they gath-
ered, and some of the rest of the money was paid as salary to second
defendant Diaz and other collectors, and to winning gamblers.145
Based on these secondary payments, defendant Santos was convicted of
145. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 509 (2008).
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money laundering under 18 USC § 1956.146  This statute prohibits the
use of “proceeds” of criminal activities for various purposes, including
transactions intended to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity.
Despite defendant Santos pleading guilty to conspiracy to launder
money, intervening circuit precedent created some confusion over what
“proceeds” referred to exactly.  The district court stated that under cir-
cuit precedent, “proceeds” referred only to transactions involving crimi-
nal profits, not criminal receipts.147  Because there was no evidence
that the transactions which Santos’ convictions were based on involved
lottery profits, the court vacated the convictions, which the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed.148
The Supreme Court reviewed the case and in a deeply divided deci-
sion affirmed the ruling of the lower courts.149  Four Justices concluded
that the term “proceeds” meant “profits” or net income and not
“receipts” or gross income.150 The plurality, written by Justice Scalia,
came to this conclusion using the canons of statutory construction.
First, they looked to the ordinary meaning of “proceeds” which they
found to be contradictory.  Then, using the rule of lenity, they inter-
preted the statute in favor of the defendants stating, “the ‘profits’ defi-
nition of ‘proceeds’ is always more defendant-friendly than the
‘receipts’ definition.”151  Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment
and Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion joined by three others.  The
dissent felt that the plurality ignored the context in which the term
“proceeds” was used.152  Justice Alito believed that by interpreting “pro-
ceeds” as profits, Congress’s intent would be frustrated and the money
laundering statute, an important tool used to fight corruption and
crime would be “maim[ed].”153
The Court’s ruling had a deep impact on the application of the
federal money laundering statute.  By restricting and narrowing the def-
inition of proceeds to defendant-friendly profits, successful prosecu-
tions for persons committing money laundering became more difficult
and more varied.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Santos, “dis-
trict courts have been all over the map in applying the ‘profits’ defini-
tion” with one court noting that Santos “raises as many issues as it
resolves.”154  With an already more narrow definition, lower courts cre-
ated further problems by debating what predicate offenses, other than
gambling, the new definition should apply to.
In particular, since the Supreme Court’s redefinition, decisions in
the lower courts could be classified as narrow, moderate, or broad.
146. Id. at 509–10.
147. Id. at 510.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 524.
150. Id. at 523.
151. Id. at 514.
152. Id. at 531 (Alito, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Rachel Zimarowski, Note, Taking a Gamble: Money Laundering After United
States v. Santos, 112 W. VA. L. REV.  1139, 1142–43 (2010) (referencing United States v.
Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 783 (5th Cir. 2008)).
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Narrow decisions restricted the application of the “profits” definition to
the predicate offense of operating an unlawful gambling business only;
such decisions were present in the Fourth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and
several district courts.  While restricting the defendant-friendly defini-
tion to only one application would make prosecutions easier, one com-
mentator contends this application of the profits definition “effectively
chang[ed] the meaning of the statute based upon its application, a
position that is in direct conflict with binding Supreme Court
precedent.”155
Alternatively, moderate decisions expanded the “profits” term to
include some predicate offenses and not others; these decisions were
present in the Third Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit, and at
least one district court. Under this purview, the courts applied the
“profits” definition to some specified unlawful activities, but not others.
As more offenses were included under the new profits definition, the
prosecution’s job became more difficult.  Additionally, this created the
problem of changing the definition of proceeds depending on the fac-
tual context of the predicate offense, which directly conflicted with core
principles of statutory interpretation and created a host of uniformity
issues.
Finally, broad decisions applied the “profits” definition to all predi-
cate offenses under the money laundering statute.  While such deci-
sions were only in several district courts, this created the biggest hurdle
for prosecutors.  The Santos profit definition, interpreted under the
rule of lenity to be the more defendant-friendly version, now applied to
all predicate offenses under the Money Laundering Act, made it so that
the whole Act was more defendant-friendly in general.  Out of all post-
Santos applications, this broad view was the most worrisome, as it greatly
tied the hands of prosecutors—a trend that we are starting to see paral-
leled with the Global-Tech willful blindness doctrine.
Each of these applications of the Santos profits standard highlights
the troubles the courts had and corresponds closely to the issues emerg-
ing from the Global-Tech decision.  While there has not yet been suffi-
cient case law to observe such a splintering as can be seen with the
Santos decision, what case law is available establishes the confusion
courts are already feeling in understanding the new willful blindness
doctrine.  Additionally, in the same way that the new Santos decision
restricted profits to the defendant-friendly proceeds, the heightened
evidentiary standard under Global-Tech makes the willful blindness doc-
trine more defendant-friendly as well.  This is a cause for concern, as
these statutes were meant to combat white-collar crime and corporate
corruption, two issues increasing in prominence and severity.
Because of these application difficulties among the lower courts,
one year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Santos, Congress
stepped in and amended the federal money laundering statute.156 In
155. Id. at 1168.
156. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–29, 123 Stat.
1617 (2009).
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this amendment, Congress stated that “proceeds” meant “gross
receipts”, thus re-broadening the definition and overruling the
Supreme Court.  As stated in United States v. Morris, the 2009 amend-
ment defined “proceeds” specifically as “any property derived from or
obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of
unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.”157  The court
in Morris states further that this definition was in direct response to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Santos, citing Senator Bayh who stated,
“this bill would overturn the Supreme Court’s narrow and confusing
decision in United States v. Santos and clarify that, as used in the Money
Laundering Control Act, the term ‘proceeds’ refers to the total
receipts.”158  According to Senator Leahy, the Santos decision was con-
trary to “congressional intent and if left uncorrected, would have
allowed those committing fraud to escape liability.”159  Thus, in the face
of a confusing Supreme Court holding relating to an important white-
collar statute, Congress stepped in and clarified their legislative intent,
thus allowing prosecutions to continue unimpeded.160
From Santos comes the lesson that Congress can and should step in
where Supreme Court decisions prove to have difficulties in application
and are contrary to legislative intent. Global-Tech and its changes to the
willful blindness standard represent such a failure, particularly in
respect to criminal statutes such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The lower courts are already splintering; much in the way they did after
the Santos decision.  Some courts evade the new willful blindness stan-
dard, others misconstrue it, and others are left to grapple with the
heightened level of proof required, an almost impossible burden to
meet.  As more cases involving the willful blindness standard of knowl-
edge emerge, it will become clearer that the standard needs to be
defined and set right by Congress.  Otherwise, important statutes such
as the FCPA, that have the option of a willful blindness mens rea, will
start to fail in application as prosecutors are unable to reach the level of
proof needed.
Congress, therefore, must pass a legislative amendment specifically
defining willful blindness in the context of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act.  This definition should not require the second prong of
“deliberate steps” that Global-Tech has imposed.  The mens rea compo-
nent of any crime is meant to encompass a subjective, mental state; it
does not make sense that objective evidence should be required to show
a subjective mindset.  Instead, the original standard of Jewell of a high
probability that the defendant knew of wrongdoing should be suffi-
157. United States v. Morris, No.  6:09-16-S-DCR, 2010 WL 1049936, at *2 (E.D. Ky.
Mar. 19, 2010)
158. Id.
159. Brian Dickerson & Klodiana Basko, Confusion in Defining “Proceeds” Under the
Money-Laundering Statute: A Survey of Circuit Opinions, 57 FED. LAW. 23 (2010).
160. For further discussion on the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,
see generally Leslie A. Dickinson, Note, Revisiting the “Merger Problem” in Money Laundering
Prosecutions Post-Santos, and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 28 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 579 (2014).
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cient.  More particularly, Congress should amend the FCPA to follow
the MPC formulation, with one who is willfully blind defined as “one
who acts with a high level of awareness of a particular fact.”161  This
definition is in line with legislative intent for the FCPA and matches
commentator opinions and pre-Global-Tech court decisions concerning
the best formulation of willful blindness.  In this way, there will be no
grey area in FCPA cases, which otherwise causes splintering decisions
among lower courts.  Additionally, the unreasonable level of proof
required will be eliminated making it so that employees of large corpo-
rations, where bribery continues to be a momentous issue, will not be
able to turn a blind eye.  Executives in corporations such as Wal-Mart,
who are potentially spending millions of dollars on bribes in foreign
countries, will not be allowed to simply say “I didn’t know” and get away
with it.  Instead, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act can reach its full
potential and crack down on corruption, creating a fairer and safer
marketplace, and bolstering public confidence in corporations, foreign
officials, and business in general.
161. Marcus, supra note 77, at 2235.
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